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Self defense is important to everyone and knowing how to protect yourself, your family, and property is crucial. Situational awareness is critical and guns can be a valuable part of your self defense strategy, especially concealed carry.

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NY State Rifle & Pistol Assoc. v. NYC   Gun Laws & Courts

Started 1/23/19 by EdGlaze; 349 views.
WALTER784

From: WALTER784

Jun-24

Very well articulated... and I agree.

However, moving forward... this is going to throw a monkey wrench in the Democrats gears to attempt to remove gun control from we the people!

FWIW

  • Edited June 24, 2022 9:13 am  by  EdGlaze
In reply toRe: msg 13
EdGlaze

From: EdGlaze

Jun-25


The Truth About The Supreme Court's Gun Ruling
23 Jun 22
[11:36]

 

The Supreme Court ruling, written by Justice Clarence Thomas, struck down a New York handgun-licensing law that required New Yorkers who want to carry a handgun in public to show a special need to defend themselves.

I want you to pay attention to how the people pushing for gun control are reacting to this decision because this decision is saying nothing more than yes; people have a right to carry a firearm to protect themselves in public.

Right now, you have every anti-gun group, anti-gun politician, and even our president saying this was not the right decision.

They are saying they do not believe you have the right to carry a firearm for your protection.

These people do not agree with the Second Amendment!

It's not about making reasonable gun control laws; they don't want you to have guns, period.

They want to get to the point where they can ban handguns, but they don't want to give anything, so when they lose something i.e., the ability to restrict people's rights in New York to carry a firearm to protect themselves, all of a sudden they're mad.

The court made clear that the Second Amendment’s guarantee of the right “to keep and bear arms” protects a broad right to carry a handgun outside the home for self-defense.

Thomas wrote, that if “the Second Amendment’s plain text covers an individual’s conduct,” the government has the burden to show that the regulation is consistent with the historical understanding of the Second Amendment.

Going forward, Thomas explained, courts should uphold gun restrictions only if there is a tradition of such regulation in U.S. history.

I explain the breakdown of the Supreme Court ruling.

  • Edited June 25, 2022 8:46 am  by  EdGlaze
In reply toRe: msg 15
EdGlaze

From: EdGlaze

Jul-3

Bruen deep dive: Is "suitability" the new "good cause"?
by Cam Edwards
26 Jun 22

Since the decision in New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen was handed down by the Supreme Court on Thursday, scores of attorneys with gun control groups and in the employ of anti-gun politicians have been scouring the opinion in the hopes of finding some language they can use to continue to make it as hard as possible for the average citizen to exercise their Second Amendment rights. While Justice Clarence Thomas’ majority opinion doesn’t give them much room to work with, there is one footnote in the opinion that has me a little concerned.

The passage in question comes early in the Bruen opinion; page 4 to be precise. Thomas is pointing out that the vast majority of states across the country do not have any sort of “justifiable need” language in their statutes; instead they are shall-issue states where “authorities must issue concealed-carry licenses whenever applicants satisfy certain threshold requirements, without granting licensing officials discretion to deny licenses based on a perceived lack of need or suitability.”

“Suitability” wasn’t an issue raised in the Bruen case, but as Thomas acknowledges in his footnote, there are a few states that give licensing authorities leeway to determine whether or not someone is “suitable” to carry a firearm.

Three States  —Connecticut, Delaware, and Rhode Island — have discretionary criteria but appear to operate like “shall issue” jurisdictions. Although Connecticut officials have discretion to deny a concealed-carry permit to anyone who is not a “suitable person,” the “suitable person” standard precludes permits only to those “individuals whose conduct has shown them to be lacking the essential character of temperament necessary to be entrusted with a weapon.”

for Delaware, the State has thus far processed 5,680 license applications and renewals in fiscal year 2022 and has denied only 112. Moreover, Delaware appears to have no licensing requirement for open carry.

Finally, Rhode Island has a suitability requirement but the Rhode Island Supreme Court has flatly denied that the “[d]emonstration of a proper showing of need” is a component of that requirement.

While these three states may operate as “shall issue” in practice, there’s no guarantee that will continue to be the case in a post-Bruen environment, and more importantly, there’s nothing stopping states like New York, California, and New Jersey from replacing their arbitrary and subjective “justifiable need” provision with an equally arbitrary and capricious finding of “suitability” before someone can lawfully own a firearm.

Here’s what the Connecticut Office of Legislative Research has to say about that state’s suitability standard:

In a recent Superior Court case, the court quoted an 1882 Connecticut Supreme Court opinion stating that suitability “is not defined by the law so that its application can be determined as mere matter of eye-sight, but it is left necessarily to be determined solely by the judgment of the commissioners based upon inquiry and information. And that the particular manner of exercising such judgment cannot be controlled by any court is too obvious to require the citation of any authorities.”

Many court opinions dealing with suitability for gun permits cite an 1894 Connecticut Supreme Court decision which involved liquor licenses for the definition of suitability.

The word “suitable” as descriptive of an applicant for license under the statute, is insusceptible of any legal definition that wholly excludes the personal views of the tribunal authorized to determine the suitability of the applicant. A person is “suitable” who by reason of his character — his reputation in the community, his previous conduct as a licensee — is shown to be suited or adapted to the orderly conduct of [an activity] which the law regards as so dangerous to public welfare that its transaction by any other than a carefully selected person duly licensed is made a criminal offense. It is patent that the adaptability of any person to such [an activity] depends upon facts and circumstances that may be indicated but cannot be fully defined by law, whose probative force will differ in different cases, and must in each case depend largely upon the sound judgment of the selecting tribunal (Smith‘s Appeal from County Commissioners, 65 Conn. 135, 138 (1894)).

One court dealing with suitability stated that the government’s interest “is to protect the safety of the general public from individuals whose conduct has shown them to be lacking the essential character or temperament necessary to be entrusted with a weapon” (Rabbit v. Leonard, 36 Conn. Sup. 108, 115 (1979)). Another court stated that the “personal views of the agency members are necessarily a factor in the decision, and similar facts and circumstances will have varying probative force in different cases,” but the facts found by the board should provide a logical inference that the person poses some danger to the public if allowed to carry a weapon outside the home or business.

Subjectivity is baked into the suitability cake, so to speak, and I’m a little concerned that Thomas treats these three states so dismissively given that these suitability requirements could be just as easily abused to deny someone their right to carry as requiring them to demonstrate a “justifiable need.”

Granted, Thomas also explicitly says elsewhere in the opinion that “because any permitting scheme can be put toward abusive ends, we do not rule out constitutional challenges to shall-issue regimes where, for example, lengthy wait times in processing license applications or exorbitant fees deny ordinary citizens their right to public carry,” so if a state like California decided to adopt a “suitability” standard that was so broad the average law-abiding citizen would still be deemed unsuitable to carry a firearm in self-defense, presumably the Court would rule that language is unconstitutional.

That doesn’t mean states won’t try this gambit, however, and because Thomas implicitly gives his stamp of approval to “suitability” requirements as lo
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EdGlaze

From: EdGlaze

Jul-3

An expert's look at Bruen decision: Part 1
by Tom Knighton
28 Jun 22

I don’t normally plan on doing two-part pieces. I can usually say what I need to say in a single post, even if it runs a tad long.

However, the Bruen decision came out last week. That means there’s been a ton of deep dives into what the decision actually means, including our own.

Yet most of us are laymen. We’re not experts on the law.

at SCOTUS Blog, Georgetown law professor Randy Barnett talks about the decision. Barnett has a Washington D.C. carry permit — and going into some of the discussion around this one will go into part 2 — and so he’s familiar with gun control and its impact.

He takes a look at Bruen, and his take is actually pretty interesting.

In particular, looking at the “text and history” approach Justice Clarence Thomas called for in his decision.

As he describes it, Thomas’ approach seems to base the existence of a right on a finding that the liberty in question, here the right to carry arms outside the home, had never been restricted. What if a liberty was not prohibited or regulated until the 1930s — say, the use of marijuana for medical purposes. Does that mean it cannot be prohibited or regulated now? I approve of the implication that it cannot be prohibited, though I should think it may still be regulated. What does the majority think? Conversely, on this conception of rights, if history reveals a long tradition of regulation (not prohibition) of a particular liberty, does this mean it cannot be considered a constitutional right?

There is, however, an even more fundamental question raised by Thomas’ text-and-history approach. It seems to assume that, once we use history to identify the “outer contours” of a constitutional right, then any such right bars not only prohibitions on its exercise but also trumps any statutory regulation of it. Prior to the New Deal, however, rights were not viewed as trumps on the regulatory power of government. Instead, the existence of a right barred the complete deprivation of it — that is, a prohibition — and statutes were “strictly” or “equitably” construed to avoid this result. And the existence of a right also required that a regulation be within the power of a legislature to enact. At the federal level, this meant a power delegated to Congress by the Constitution. At the state  level, this meant what is called the state’s “police power.” While broad, the state police power was not unlimited.

To assess whether this is the case requires a court to evaluate whether there is a sufficient fit between the ends of the legislation and the means adopted to achieve it. Or, as Alexander Hamilton put the matter: Congress “has only a right to pass such laws as are necessary and proper to accomplish the objects entrusted to it,” and “the relation between the measure and the end … must be the criterion of constitutionality.” This sounds like a means-ends analysis to me.

Thomas seems to want to limit the original scope of a constitutional right by his historical inquiry. And then the right, so limited, may not be restricted in any way. If rights are this absolute, however, then we cannot afford to recognize very many if government is to function. This would explain Thomas’ apparent movement toward an “enumerated rights only” view of constitutional rights (though he has not yet committed himself to this view). But viewing rights as absolute in this way is quite modern and ahistorical, and its invocation in a purportedly originalist opinion is therefore surprising.

It’s an interesting take. Now, admittedly, I have the absolutist view on our rights and I’m not sure I agree that it’s ahistorical. However, it’s not something I’m interested in debating, all things considered.

The truth is that while I, personally, hold that view, I understand that I’m in the minority.

What matters, though, is that the “text and history” standard has the potential to be huge in the long run. After all, there is no text or history banning a category of weapon in common use nor is there any for restricting how much ammunition a firearm can hold.

Yet that may just be the tip of the iceberg.

Banning accessories like bump stocks or pistol braces? Again, no text or history suggests this was a practice when the Second Amendment was penned. Mandatory training before getting a permit? Hell, there’s no evidence of permitting at that time either.

In fact, there are few gun control laws that can reasonably withstand such an examination, which should well put all gun control enthusiasts on alert.

In reply toRe: msg 17
EdGlaze

From: EdGlaze

Jul-3

An expert's look at Bruen decision: Part 2
by Tom Knighton
29 Jun 22

On Tuesday, I took a look at a post from the SCOTUS Blog that argued about the impact of the Bruen decision.

As I noted then, there was a lot to talk about from the piece and I couldn’t do it all justice in just one post. Besides, there are aspects there that create an entirely new conversation, one I’m eager to have.

Author Randy Barnett is a Georgetown law professor and, oddly enough, someone with a concealed carry permit in the District of Columbia.

Yet he talked about just what he had to go through to get it and whether that would survive the “text and history” standard.

When it comes to the policy, I must offer a full disclosure: I am a concealed-carry permit holder in the District of Columbia. The ordinances governing concealed carry outside the home in D.C. make it a “may issue” regime resembling that of New York. But due to a circuit court opinion in 2017 holding the “may issue” scheme to be unconstitutional, D.C. became a “shall issue” regime. At the behest of gun-control activists, the attorney general of the District of Columbia opted not to petition the Supreme Court lest it concur with the circuit court’s holding, effectively requiring “shall issue” regimes nationwide. Yet, five years later, this is what has now come to pass in Bruen.

After 2017, I was entitled to a license to carry outside my home the handgun that I had a constitutional right to buy and own thanks to District of Columbia v. Heller — provided I met certain requirements. I had to pay an application fee of $75. I had to submit my application in person at the Metropolitan Police Department headquarters and be photographed and fingerprinted at an additional cost of $35. I had to pass a federal background check. I had to enroll in and pay for an approved firearms training course, which included 16 hours of classroom study of D.C. gun laws as well as the law governing the use of deadly force, plus another two hours of range instruction. In 2018, the course cost $250 plus $20 for the range fee. The monetary cost of the license amounted to $380. This was in addition to the $125 tax I paid to D.C. on the purchase of my handgun, which brought the total regulatory cost to $505. Since the course took 18 hours to complete, I took it on a Saturday and a Sunday so as not to lose two days of work.

There being no gun ranges in the District of Columbia, my course was taught in Virginia. The instructor was African American, and most of the other students in the course were members of underrepresented groups, which is unsurprising given the demographics of D.C. Since it is doubtful that any other Georgetown professor has a concealed-carry license, I suppose I too was a member of an underrepresented group.

Every two years, I must renew the license. If I miss renewing within the 30-day window before my permit expires, I have to start all over. So, two years later, I had to pay another $75 fee and complete a recertification class consisting of four hours of training, and two hours of range training from an MPD-certified firearms training instructor, which cost $160. I can afford all this, of course, though I cannot say the same for all other citizens of D.C.

For the record, having taken the D.C. concealed-carry course, I can attest that being informed of the vagaries of D.C. gun-possession laws, as well as the basic principles governing armed self-defense, was extremely valuable before one carries in public. This education is at least as valuable as the written “rules of the road” test one initially must pass to get one’s first driver’s license allowing one to operate an automobile on a public thoroughfare.

But this educational benefit could easily be gained in a 2-3 hour class. The rest of the classroom component can be viewed as make-weight and even punitive. Will the court entertain such considerations when evaluating a law like D.C.’s? How else will it smoke out pretextual regulations motivated by hostility to a particular constitutional right — or by hostility to the exercise of the right by members of particular groups? Both would qualify as “abusive ends.”.

It’s certainly a valid question, to say the least, and part of the reason many of us oppose training requirements.

It’s not that we don’t think people should be educated about gun-possession laws or use-of-force laws, either. In fact, I tell every new gun owner I encounter to do precisely that. Further, they need to be educated in the safe handling of firearms as well as in the basic use of them.

But when the government starts mandating things like that, it takes the form of abuse.

An 18-hour course over two days isn’t necessarily an introductory course teaching just the basics of how to be a law-abiding concealed carry license holder. This is getting beyond that and is, instead, looking to make it onerous to even try to exercise one’s Second Amendment right.

That’s especially true when you consider that the District of Columbia has one of the worst poverty rates in the nation when compared to states.

As a result, the $505 Barnett mentions having to spend in order to exercise his Second Amendment rights — that’s $505 over and above the cost of a firearm — amounts to a poll tax that many poorer folks in D.C. simply cannot afford to pay.

Based on the “text and history” standard laid out in Bruen, I honestly don’t see how this particular regulatory scheme could ever survive a legal challenge. Especially since Justice Clarence Thomas warned states to be careful with what regulations they impose so they don’t reach this particular point.

It seems that someone probably should do just that.

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